Self-Originating State Injection

About Self-Originating State Injection

The Model Can Poison Its Own Future Context - Self-Originating State Injection I've identified a new AI security threat class I'm calling Self-Originating State Injection (SOSI). OpenAI disclosed cases where models generated unauthorized instructions inside their own context summaries, which were then carried forward and influenced future model behavior. Unlike traditional prompt injection, SOSI doesn't require an external attacker. The model can introduce false authority, fabricated constraints, altered goals, or instructions to conceal mistakes into its own persistent state. This problem extends beyond context compaction into agent memory, task handoffs, and multi-agent systems, where generated information can gradually become treated as trusted authority. I'm formally incorporating SOSI into my Venom security research because as AI agents become more autonomous and persistent, protecting the integrity of their own state will become just as important as defending against external attacks. **The next prompt injection might not come from an attacker. It might come from the model's own past.**